The list of virtues proposed here brings with it issues that afflict all such lists. Although the effort of extrapolating a set of traits to cope with the experience of illness and foster positive coping is essential, the identification of them may come across as non-satisfactory. Whenever a list of traits is proposed, there is always an underlying dissatisfaction as the list is likely to be incomplete. It is difficult, arbitrary, and even somewhat presumptuous to imagine that one establishes a definitive list of traits that applies to everyone in all contexts. It will always lead to the question of how it can be modified, whether it can benefit from a reduction or whether an extension is appropriate. Unlike other domains, such as biology, where one might aim for a comprehensive enumeration of anatomical structures, the moral sphere resists this kind of closure. Morality does not lend itself to exhaustive categorization because the terrain it encompasses is far more expansive and fluid. In this sense, completeness in moral theorizing remains an aspirational ideal rather than an achievable endpoint.