In the previous sections, I argued that the idea that the evolutionary history of our species selected a cognitive infrastructure that is (i) specifically designed for moral cognition and morality, and (ii) rigidly biased towards parochialism and exclusivity is problematic. On the contrary, increasing anthropological evidence and recent evolutionary models suggest that the main etiological, functionalist-adaptationist explanations of a hard-wired moral psychology are empirically inaccurate. As we have seen, the social, epistemic, and environmental conditions of the EEA were far more complex than the oversimplified accounts often presented in the literature. Furthermore, the core premise of classic evolutionary psychology, which conceives the EEA-Pleistocene as a privileged period in human evolution to explain current cognitive and behavioral traits, appears unjustified. If the main rationale beyond this view is that the late Pleistocene represents the epoch in which our species reached its current anatomical configuration, then this view relies on a form of neuro-anatomical reductionism and essentialism about human nature which is frankly untenable—especially given its stark contrast with historical and empirical evidence.