In contemporary discussions in empirically informed philosophy, as well as in the cognitive and social sciences, several scholars have claimed that the psychological changes necessary to address the most pressing collective problems of our time, and to comply with demanding normative standards and requirements, are virtually impossible for human beings to achieve—at least through ordinary socio-cultural means and projects aimed at fostering epistemic, moral, and social improvement (see Sauer 2019; Persson & Savulescu 2017; 2019; Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Levy 2021). At the core of this pessimistic view lies the idea that the cognitive infrastructure of human beings is rigidly shaped and constrained by the evolutionary history of our species (Barkow et al. 1992; Haidt 2012; Haselton & Nettle 2006; Street 2006; Clark & Winegard 2020; Clark et al. 2019; see also Buchanan & Powell 2015; 2018; and Buchanan 2020 for further critical discussions). As anticipated, according to this view, the human brain and mind have evolved up to their current configuration because they allowed humans to adaptively respond to existential threats and cooperative problems in pre-modern environments and societies, mostly over the late Pleistocene. This is why, according to many scholars, humans are nowadays ill-prepared to face complex problems that recent developments and conditions of life created: our minds were not selected to face challenges of this scale.