This book discusses and criticizes the idea that human psychology and morality are direct products of evolution by natural selection, and that this would significantly influence both the psychology and content of moral beliefs and norms, constituting a major obstacle to significant psychological, epistemic, and moral change (Sauer 2019; 2023; Persson & Savulescu 2012; 2017; Klenk & Sauer 2020; Street 2006; Levy 2021). In the recent scientific and philosophical debate, many scholars have defended this view on the basis of adaptationist and functionalist hypotheses about the natural evolution of moral cognition and institutions (Joyce 2006; Tomasello 2016; Guardo 2024). These views state that selective pressures in small and close-knit pre-modern societies, in which humanity has lived for most of its evolutionary history, favored a tribalistic, exclusive, and short-sighted psychology, which continues to strongly influence and limit human cognition and behavior nowadays, as decades of experimental research in cognitive, social and moral psychology would confirm. This cognitive architecture is seen by many as very hard, if not impossible, to modify; and the same would be true for moral beliefs and cultures that inevitably depend on evaluative attitudes that are directly shaped by selective pressures (Street 2006; Joyce 2006; Persson & Savulescu 2017).