Differential Fault Analysis Against AES Based on a Hybrid Fault Model

In this paper, a differential fault analysis based on a hybrid fault model is proposed. The hybrid fault model is comprising a one-byte and multi-byte by injecting faults in the state. Through both theory and simulations, which successfully derived the key of AES-128, 192, and 256 with two, three, and four pairs of faulty ciphertexts (pairs of faulty ciphertext refers to the correct ciphertext and the responding faulty ciphertext after injecting faults) without exhaustive search, respectively. Compared with the latest methods, the method proposed only requires the fault injected in a single round, thus it is easier to carry out to an attacker. When considering AES-192, fewer faulty ciphertexts are needed. In addition, for both AES-192 and 256, our method requires fewer depths of induced fault (the entire key can be retrieved only need to induce fault in the T-2 round). Thus, the DFA proposed in this article is more efficient.