This chapter analyses the governance of Japanese firms based on two aspects of governance structure: financial governance and internal governance. The key questions are whether they are complementary or not and, if so, whether such complementarity persists over time. The autor identifies firms with a relatively high level of debt borrowing and a high level of shareholding by financial institutions in 1984 as Type J firms and the opposite as Type N firms. The results of the empirical analysis confirm that Type J firms maintain their policy appointing the winner of the internal promotion tournament to the top management even after the 2000s. Meanwhile, the porportion of debt financing has declined significantly over time. These results suggest that the commonly held view that financial governance complements internal governance is not necessarily true. On the other hand, examining governance in terms of financial institutions’ shareholdings shows that their function of supporting the continuation of promotional tournaments is still evident. In his comments for Uchida, “The Japanese Governance Model Today,” Hideaki Miyajima examines the complementarity between institutions and its robustness from the broader perspective of the diversity of capitalism. Based on the empirical findings by Uchida, Miyajima argues that the unique mechanisms that underpin the performance of Japan’s promotion tournament system need to be clarified.