Analyzing the impact of information attacks on the stability of islanded microgrids in distribution networks enables effective countermeasures, enhancing power supply reliability. Current approaches lack integration of information attacks with actual grid operation control and overlook the influence of Distributed Generation on system stability. Moreover, flexible and reliable measures to address islanding faults resulting from different information attacks are lacking. This study explores the Cyber-Physical Systems of islanded microgrids, proposing their structure in islanded operation. It discusses the impact of different attack targets and types on loads and DG, constructing an attack model for FDIA. The study also examines the interrelations within the DG system under this attack model. Lastly, an innovative evaluation method for islanded system resilience to information attacks is presented. It judges the impact on Distributed Generation, load distribution, and circuit breaker status post-attack, quantifying the effects through DG, load, and circuit breaker matrices. If the impact remains below a set threshold, the attack's effects are deemed minor, obviating immediate island removal. This method enhances microgrid adaptability and recovery, offering new theoretical support and practical guidance for safe and stable microgrid operation.