Study on Anti-defection Law and Inner-Party Democracy with Specific Reference to India and the United Kingdom

The inner-party democracy has become a buzz word not because of the recent election in the Indian National Congress to elect its president but due to the elections in the British Conservative Party to choose their leader after ousting Mr. Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The Representation of the People Act, 1951, did not insist on internal elections, and there is no punishment for not conducting periodical elections by the political parties as per their party constitutional norms. The question here is ‘can we adopt the U.K. model of inner-party elections?’ or ‘Do we need a unique system of party elections?’ The Indian Constitution miserably failed to mention the party system and its functional aspects at the commencement of the Constitution, although we adopt party-led democracy. Unlike Britain, the members of a political party owe great allegiance and gratitude not only to their party leader but also to the heirs of their leader. The members never attempt to voice their dissent against their leader due to the threat of the anti-defection law, and it is difficult to expect them to criticize their own party leaders or party’s policies during the inner-party elections. This article focuses on the political defections in India and how it is controlled through (mis)use of anti-defection law, in comparison with the major parliamentary democracies, particularly U.K. The analysis extends to the feasibility of adopting inner-party democracy with the reformed disqualification procedure of members under X Schedule of the Constitution as suggested by the Indian Supreme Court. This paper argues that the X Schedule in the Indian Constitution has been watered down and made almost ineffective due to selective approach of its use on defections by the speaker, and the ill-intended law acts as a stumbling blog to promote the inner-party democracy. It is suggested that the retention of anti-defection laws will not allow inner-party democracy to blossom in India.