Understanding Hospital Violence in China

This chapter examines extreme medical disputes—hospital violence—and the government’s responses. In the first decade of the 2000s, violence against doctors (yinao) in the workplace was repeatedly reported. As a new type of social conflict, hospital violence is easily and quickly politicized and escalates into mass incidents targeting health institutions. This chapter aims to fill the scholarly gap in tracing the government responses towards hospital violence and its outcomes. I first theorize the behaviors of hospital violence from the rightful resistance perspective by examining their mobilizing structure, framing strategies, sequential targeting tactics, etc. Drawing on intensive interviews and media data, I find that the government has adopted selective punishment to avoid blame and dispute escalation. This chapter demonstrates that the government’s selective punishment strategies are contingent upon three factors: (1) the degree of violence, (2) the disputants’ strategies, and (3) the disputants’ moral power. This study suggests that selective law enforcement has led hospitals to adopt self-protection strategies and has provided further political space for disruptive behaviors in health institutions.