India’s Environmental Diplomacy: In Pursuit of a Safer Planet

This chapter seeks to assess India’s track record in environmental diplomacy with reference to its participation in global climate negotiations since the early 1990s. India’s negotiating position was determined by a set of somewhat conflicting features: its bleak poverty scenario and extreme climate vulnerability; as well as its recent economic boom pushing it into the league of top per capita GHG emitters. In this context the chapter narrates how India through the decades shed its ‘naysayer’/‘deal-breaker’ image and emerged as a ‘responsible’ and ‘constructive’ contributor to the negotiation process. In the global climate parleys, India initially sought to project a developing countries’ perspective backed by the G77 coalition, emphasized the values of equity and fairness, and asserted that the onus of making sacrifices for mitigating the climate hazards should squarely rest with the developed countries who were in the first place responsible for triggering climate change. It firmly rejected any suggestion that the developing countries should also share mitigation responsibilities which implied making unwarranted compromises with the pursuit of their much-needed development agenda. This position was broadly endorsed by and incorporated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992); the Kyoto Protocol (1997) also acknowledged the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of developed and developing countries in arresting climate change. In the new millennium, however, the developed countries led by the US steadily turned the heat on the ‘more advanced’ developing nations—China and India in particular—arguing that they counted among the largest ‘polluters’ of contemporary times, and therefore should not enjoy the exemptions allowed to the Southern states but undertake appropriate mitigation commitments. India first sought to stonewall this demand in collaboration with the BASIC group, but it soon realized that this stubborn stand was rendering it progressively isolated in the global climate parlance. This prompted New Delhi to change tack: first Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised to ensure that India’s per capita emissions did not exceed that of the developed countries; then Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh announced at the Copenhagen climate summit (2009) that India was ready to give up its longstanding emphasis on ‘per capita convergence’ in favour of a ‘per capita plus’ approach. Differences of opinion did surface within its policy establishment and team of negotiators regarding this change of gear; however, India ultimately went on to sign the Paris Agreement (2015) under the stewardship of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, accepted the notion of ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’, and announced an ambitious programme of reducing the carbon intensity of its economy through expansion of its clean energy capacity and installation of substantial carbon sinks among others. In explaining this evolution of India’s negotiating posture, the author goes beyond the variable of international pressure mentioned above, and looks at other factors such as redefinition of India’s economic concerns in the light of the emerging notion of ‘co-benefits’ and growing awareness about the prospects of alternative energy resources; wider dissemination of scientific knowledge about climate change and rising sensitivity towards India’s severe climate vulnerability; change in the domestic consensus regarding India’s external climate policy; increasing interest shown by the top political leadership in steering climate negotiations; and changes in the overall direction of India’s foreign policy. The chapter winds up with a summary of the post-Paris developments, a critique of India’s role in global climate negotiations, and a set of recommendations.