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Interlocking Directorates of Bank’s Supervisory Board and Managing Board Members in Other Enterprises in the Postwar Period Before the Enactment of the 1965 Corporations Law

  • Toshio Yamazaki

摘要

In Germany, a system of interlocking directorates led by large banks was established on the basis of a deposit stock system that allowed a bank to exercise voting rights at a general meeting under the expansion of the secondary stock market and cooperation between banks after World War II. Such a system formed the basis of the banks’ influence on corporations and exchanging and sharing information, and coordination of interests and conflicts between a bank and industrial enterprises and among corporations. How did the three largest banks that realized reconcentration after deconcentration under the postwar reforms directed by victorious nations build personnel connections with enterprises in various industrial sectors? This chapter analyzes the interlocking directorates of large banks in the late 1950s. During this period, the interlocking directorates were developed in various industries and companies because there was no limit to the number in which one person might have mandates in the supervisory board by law, such as the 1965 Corporations Law. The conditions of a direct interlocking directorate between a bank and enterprises in diverse industries and the indirect interlocking directorate established between banks on the supervisory board of other enterprises are explained through the distribution of industries where interlocking directorates existed, kinds of interlocking mandates of the supervisory board, and holding of plural posts. In this regard, the cases of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank are examined.