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A multifactorial model of countering targeted attacks (APT attacks) in the context of available financial resources (FR) within a bilinear multi-step quality game with multiple terminal surfaces in a fuzzy formulation is considered. The distinction of the model discussed from others is that it manages to reflect the variability of financial defense strategies against APT attacks and the strategies of the attackers in the dynamics of the interaction of opposing parties. This allows considering the general problem of cybersecurity within a game scheme, including for tasks of countering APT attacks in a fuzzy formulation, with the available FR on the defense side. A bilinear multi-step quality game of multidimensional objects with fuzzy information was proposed to solve the problem. It is shown that solving quality tasks considering their multidimensionality and bilinearity of players’ interaction dynamics is a quite challenging problem. The problem formulated in the study was solved using R. Bellman’s optimality principle. The solution was found within the scheme of a positional multi-step game with fuzzy information. Sets of preferences and optimal strategies for the first player’s distribution of FR for building a defense system against APT attacks were identified. The solution is presented from the defense side’s perspective and provides the necessary conditions that guarantee the first ally player the ability to ensure the protection of informatization objects (IO) within a finite time with a given reliability. The model presented in the work is designed for implementation as a software module of the intellectual information system being developed for searching strategies to counter APT attacks. The conducted computational experiment allowed visualizing the game results, during which the financial capabilities of the opposing parties are analyzed. It is shown that by determining an approximate volume of FR that the attacking side can invest in an APT attack, one can also determine the amount of funds required by the defense side.

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Multifactorial Model for Targeted Attacks Counteracting Within the Framework of a Multi-Step Quality Game with Fuzzy Information

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • V. Lakhno,
  • V. Malyukov,
  • O. Smirnov,
  • B. Bebeshko,
  • V. Chubaievskiy,
  • M. Zhumadilova,
  • I. Malyukova,
  • S. Smirnov

摘要

A multifactorial model of countering targeted attacks (APT attacks) in the context of available financial resources (FR) within a bilinear multi-step quality game with multiple terminal surfaces in a fuzzy formulation is considered. The distinction of the model discussed from others is that it manages to reflect the variability of financial defense strategies against APT attacks and the strategies of the attackers in the dynamics of the interaction of opposing parties. This allows considering the general problem of cybersecurity within a game scheme, including for tasks of countering APT attacks in a fuzzy formulation, with the available FR on the defense side. A bilinear multi-step quality game of multidimensional objects with fuzzy information was proposed to solve the problem. It is shown that solving quality tasks considering their multidimensionality and bilinearity of players’ interaction dynamics is a quite challenging problem. The problem formulated in the study was solved using R. Bellman’s optimality principle. The solution was found within the scheme of a positional multi-step game with fuzzy information. Sets of preferences and optimal strategies for the first player’s distribution of FR for building a defense system against APT attacks were identified. The solution is presented from the defense side’s perspective and provides the necessary conditions that guarantee the first ally player the ability to ensure the protection of informatization objects (IO) within a finite time with a given reliability. The model presented in the work is designed for implementation as a software module of the intellectual information system being developed for searching strategies to counter APT attacks. The conducted computational experiment allowed visualizing the game results, during which the financial capabilities of the opposing parties are analyzed. It is shown that by determining an approximate volume of FR that the attacking side can invest in an APT attack, one can also determine the amount of funds required by the defense side.