A Dynamic Game Study on the “Big Data Discriminatory Pricing” Behavior of E-commerce Platforms Under Government Regulation

The emergence of big data killing behavior is essentially a “differentiated pricing” behavior. The effective use of big data can promote the digital transformation of enterprises, bringing greater benefits to enterprises compared to the past price discrimination. However, “big data discriminatory pricing” also has widespread harmfulness, which has a huge negative impact on the welfare of consumers and the entire society. This article explores the reasons for the e-commerce platform’s “discriminatory pricing” behavior from the perspective of consumers and e-commerce platforms under government control. This article draws on domestic and foreign literature to establish an evolutionary game model of e-commerce platform “discriminatory pricing” behavior and user consumer “loyalty behavior”, and introduces government regulation and punishment mechanisms. Research has shown that when reputation losses and penalties are high, by “discriminatory pricing” they not only effectively curb the platform’s behavior of paying too much attention to the more benefits and thus encroach on the rights and interests of consumers, but also help improve the scope of government regulation of the degree of “discriminatory pricing” of the platform. In addition, a government consumer coordination and supervision mechanism’s introduction has a significant inhibitory effect on the “killing” behavior of e-commerce platforms.