Liberalism and Dignity: The Soul’s Humble Upbringing and Vulnerability

The first purpose of this chapter is to examine dignity from a perspective of economic philosophy and theories of justice. Specifically, I will analyze the following three conceptual distinctions that have been controversial related to dignity (Sects. 3–5). They are (1) “price” versus “dignity;” (2) “individual dignity” versus “human dignity;” and (3) “equality of human rights” versus “respect for dignity.” The second and more important purpose of this chapter is to use the concept of dignity to illuminate certain conundrums that liberalism has left behind and to reexamine the reach and limits of liberalism. Thus, this paper explores theoretical possibilities of the concept of dignity based on relevant literature. Section 2 introduces the concept of dignity in John Rawls’ theory of justice. Section 6 reviews relevant literature on the attempts to critically develop the concept of dignity in Rawls’ theory of justice. “From my perspective, it is just that soul and spirit, with all their dignity and human scale, are now so complex and unique states of an organism…. And this is of course the difficult job, is it not: to move the spirit from its nowhere pedestal to a somewhere place, while preserving its dignity and importance, to recognize its humble origins and vulnerability, and yet still call upon its guidance (Damasio, ).”