Market Virtues and Respect for Human Dignity

Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden have provided a normative defense of markets from a virtue ethics perspective. They interpret market exchange as being a practice in the sense of Alasdair MacIntyre. For Bruni and Sugden, the telos of a market is mutual benefit and a market virtue is a character trait or disposition that contributes to the realization of this benefit. They regard market virtues as embodying a moral attitude towards market interactions that is characterized by reciprocity. For MacIntyre, this is a partial account of a virtue. To qualify as a virtue, it is also necessary that it contributes to the good of an individual’s life taken as a whole and to the social tradition in which both practices and individuals are embedded. We adopt MacIntye’s understanding of a virtue and consider the extent to which Bruni and Sugden’s account of market virtues is compatible with respecting the fundamental human good of dignity in Kant’s sense of this term.