错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Evolutionary Game Analysis of RFID Technology Adoption in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

  • Wenchuan Li,
  • Ying Huang,
  • QingNing Zhou

摘要

As the core technology of the Internet of Thing (IoT), RFID has received attention from all walks of life. Based on the dual utility of RFID technology to improve the recycling rate and inventory accuracy rate, a Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) composed of a manufacturer and a retailer was taken as the research object. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, a dynamic game analysis on the adoption of RFID technology in CLSC was conducted in this paper. Considering the bounded rationality, adoption cost, adoption income and cost allocation of system members, an evolutionary game model of CLSC adopting RFID technology was established. Firstly, from the perspective of static game, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution was solved. Then from the perspective of evolutionary game, the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system was solved, and its evolutionary stability and the sensitivity of each factor were analyzed. Finally, through numerical example simulation, the evolution path of the game model and the sensitivity of each parameter were analyzed, and the previous proposition was verified, which proved the value of the research.