The Principle and Structure of Cyberspace Endogenous Security and Safety

As can be seen from the previous chapter, the incomplete intersection principle (IIP) points out that if the functions of DVR in a cybersecurity defense system cannot be completely intersected, it will be impossible to have the structural capabilities to prevent unknown security threats (especially internal-external collaborative network attacks). In other words, no matter what kind of security technology is added to the target system or how many built-in, embedded, endosymbiotic, and other non-integrated defense measures are deployed, it is theoretically impossible to effectively resist “unknown unknown” security threats or “internal-external collaborative” cyberattacks. This chapter needs to prove whether the “DVR complete intersection” can, in mechanism, transform generalized uncertain disturbances into differential-mode or perceivable common-mode security incidents that can be described by probabilistic tools in the DVR domain, i.e., to theoretically analyze and prove whether this “DVR transformation” has the basic attributes mentioned in the vision of CESS. In a more general sense, it is to prove whether the inference that “structure determines security” is true at the theoretical level. Then, there is also a discussion about what kind of model or algorithm can technically realize DVR complete intersection. It is found that the introduction of a state or output feedback control mechanism on the basis of a dissimilar redundancy structure (DRS) can form a feedback loop consisting of all links, elements, or variables in the structure of DVR complete intersection that are well connected and causally related to each other, where a change in any one of them will cause a change in other links or elements, thus forming a feedback loop and controlling movement. Therefore, the feedback control is mechanically able to adjust variety (V) and redundancy (R) in real time through the dynamics (D) of iterative convergence, thus meeting the requirements of the DVR complete intersection model. In view of this, the author invented the dynamic, heterogeneous, and redundant (DHR) architecture (the same papers also called “the mimic architecture (MA)” or “mimic defense”) [1] based on the principle that “structure determines security.” It solves multiple intertwined functional safety, network security, and even information/data security problems such as unknown threats or attacks in the architectural environment with an integrated effect. Then, this chapter introduces in detail the structure and function of the DHR architecture, the mechanism of ESS, the environmentally encrypted attack surface (AS), and the engineering expression of ESS and proves from the perspective of cryptography that, compared with the “perfect secrecy” model of Shannon’s information theory, the ideal DHR model, which does not rely on prior knowledge, essentially puts forward an innovative method to obtain “perfect safety” functions through “structural coding/environmental encryption.” This enriches the connotation and extension of the ESS theory. Finally, a general testing and “golden standard” of measurement of ESS functions and performance—the white box plug method—is given.