Predominant literature surrounding temporary labor migration associates decision-making processes to institutions in migrant-hosting states, primarily in the Persian Gulf where the kafala system stands as the most notorious of migration regimes. Amendments or reforms to these policies are commonly explained by “black box” politics, implying that changes to kafala are privy to the preferences of select Gulf rulers, despite the existence of regional forums such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue that regularly bring migrant-receiving and migrant-sending states together in policymaking efforts. Current theories also fail to consider the sovereign actions of migrant-sending states in reforming immigration and labor laws for their emigrant populations. But to what extent do these states advocate for better governance for their workers abroad? This paper constructs a theoretical framework that illustrates the conditions in which sending states advocate for, refuse to, or are reluctant in engaging in labor reform for their expatriate workforce in the Persian Gulf. I argue that sending states act strategically when it comes to advocating for migrant workers’ wellbeing and such decisions are contigent upon the value of remittances accrued, preferences of domestic state actors in both the public and private spheres, and international reputational costs, the latter of which may jeopardize potential investments in the future. These conditions are illustrated through a case analysis of Bangladeshi state agencies, their roles, and policies towards migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. The findings in this paper contribute to growing research on the agency of migrant-sending states and how their preferences shape labor migration in authoritarian states in the Global South.