While reconstruction attacks on encrypted databases have garnered sig-nificant research attention in recent years, existing studies predominantly focus on static database scenarios through leakage analysis, demonstrating limited practical applicability in dynamic environments. Although update recovery attacks have emerged as a promising approach for dynamic databases, current research re-mains confined to one-dimensional settings. To address real-world security de-mands, this paper presents an update recovery attack for two-dimensional en-crypted databases. Our innovative methodology leverages distinct query volume patterns and minimal access location leakage to achieve precise recovery of re-stricted area dimensions in encrypted databases. Specifically,we utilize character-istic query volume arrays to determine spatial constraints, then employ differential analysis of pre- and post-update patterns to effectively trace potential modification locations. Moreover,the proposed attack framework incorporates secondary up-date mechanisms and joint pattern analysis, enabling progressive refinement of reconstructed value ranges. Finally,we simulate the attack using real datasets to prove its accuracy and practicality. It is a successful exploration of attacking high-dimensional dynamic databases with minimal known conditions,successfully solved the problem that existing attacks cannot be exploited on two-dimensional databases.