This article considers a closed-loop power supply chain which comprises one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single electricity product. The market demand of the electricity product is linearly dependent on selling price and retail sale carbon effort, and the amount of recycling of waste electricity products is linearly dependent on recycling price and retail carbon effort. We find that if the producer is equity sensitive, it harms the profitability of the electricity supply chain and the profitability of the members of the electricity supply chain. Meanwhile, if retailers are equity-sensitive, they engage in high levels of carbon effort but lead producers to set low-carbon prices, among other things. To examine the effects of key model-parameters on the decisions, we perform a sensitivity analysis for a numerical example.

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An Incentive Mechanism Design in a Closed-Loop Power Supply Chain Regarding Fairness Concerns

  • Ding Li,
  • Tao Fang,
  • Jiasheng Wu,
  • Qinglong Meng,
  • Liang Wang

摘要

This article considers a closed-loop power supply chain which comprises one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single electricity product. The market demand of the electricity product is linearly dependent on selling price and retail sale carbon effort, and the amount of recycling of waste electricity products is linearly dependent on recycling price and retail carbon effort. We find that if the producer is equity sensitive, it harms the profitability of the electricity supply chain and the profitability of the members of the electricity supply chain. Meanwhile, if retailers are equity-sensitive, they engage in high levels of carbon effort but lead producers to set low-carbon prices, among other things. To examine the effects of key model-parameters on the decisions, we perform a sensitivity analysis for a numerical example.