This book explores legal solutions to mitigate risks in Vietnam’s P2P lending business by proposing a shift toward collective lending schemes. It highlights that Vietnam’s current legal regulations do not enable platform service providers to adequately diversify P2P lender risks. Based on the idea of mutual help and mutual funding, the book suggests the introduction of contractual schemes that allow lenders to contribute funds to professionally managed collective pools. These pooled structures—whether jointly owned or managed by a service provider—can enhance risk-sharing and provide more secure investment channels for lenders. Drawing on regulatory experiences of the United States and Japan in collective lending, investor solicitation, and the establishment and management of investment funds, the book suggests that Vietnam should regulate the interest in collective lending pools as securities. In addition, the book identified that Vietnam should implement less stringent regulations compared to those applicable to conventional fund management and securities businesses. Such a change would enable platform service providers to legally engage in soliciting investors to contribute to a collective investment scheme for lending, establish funds for lending small loans, and manage such funds. By combining comparative insights and regulatory analysis, the book concludes that collective lending could serve as a safer, more sustainable alternative to traditional P2P models in Vietnam, promoting financial inclusion while safeguarding investor interests.

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Conclusion

  • Yen Hai Nguyen

摘要

This book explores legal solutions to mitigate risks in Vietnam’s P2P lending business by proposing a shift toward collective lending schemes. It highlights that Vietnam’s current legal regulations do not enable platform service providers to adequately diversify P2P lender risks. Based on the idea of mutual help and mutual funding, the book suggests the introduction of contractual schemes that allow lenders to contribute funds to professionally managed collective pools. These pooled structures—whether jointly owned or managed by a service provider—can enhance risk-sharing and provide more secure investment channels for lenders. Drawing on regulatory experiences of the United States and Japan in collective lending, investor solicitation, and the establishment and management of investment funds, the book suggests that Vietnam should regulate the interest in collective lending pools as securities. In addition, the book identified that Vietnam should implement less stringent regulations compared to those applicable to conventional fund management and securities businesses. Such a change would enable platform service providers to legally engage in soliciting investors to contribute to a collective investment scheme for lending, establish funds for lending small loans, and manage such funds. By combining comparative insights and regulatory analysis, the book concludes that collective lending could serve as a safer, more sustainable alternative to traditional P2P models in Vietnam, promoting financial inclusion while safeguarding investor interests.