This chapter, using the pooled data from our opinion polls, highlights the changes in the strength of sectarianism by interpreting the cycle of conflicts arising during election and inter-election periods, using party support structures as a clue. The analysis results demonstrate that sectarianism becomes politically significant during election periods but its political influence and importance decrease during inter-election periods. Furthermore, during the inter-election period, political distrust is recognized as a more serious issue than sectarianism, and factors different from sectarianism are emphasized in party support. In other words, during the inter-election period, the political significance of the factor of sectarianism diminishes, making sectarian conflicts less likely to occur. Without the intense political mobilization triggered by elections, sectarianism does not escalate, and conflicts do not expand. Thus, the chapter concludes that as the activation of political mobilization during elections promotes conflicts, and the subsequent decline of conflicts creates a cycle of conflict, resulting in the avoidance of division of the state and the nation.

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When Conflicts are Incited: Depicting the Cycle of Sectarian Conflict from Party Support Structures

  • Dai Yamao

摘要

This chapter, using the pooled data from our opinion polls, highlights the changes in the strength of sectarianism by interpreting the cycle of conflicts arising during election and inter-election periods, using party support structures as a clue. The analysis results demonstrate that sectarianism becomes politically significant during election periods but its political influence and importance decrease during inter-election periods. Furthermore, during the inter-election period, political distrust is recognized as a more serious issue than sectarianism, and factors different from sectarianism are emphasized in party support. In other words, during the inter-election period, the political significance of the factor of sectarianism diminishes, making sectarian conflicts less likely to occur. Without the intense political mobilization triggered by elections, sectarianism does not escalate, and conflicts do not expand. Thus, the chapter concludes that as the activation of political mobilization during elections promotes conflicts, and the subsequent decline of conflicts creates a cycle of conflict, resulting in the avoidance of division of the state and the nation.