We present RAG Sign, a cryptographic framework designed to establish immutable identities for RAG-enabled LLM signed outputs. This provides cryptographically authenticated, non-repudiable evidence that outputs originated with a specific RAG-enabled LLM bound to model instances via digital signatures. We perform a rigorous security analysis, demonstrating the unforgeability and non-repudiation properties of our scheme under standard cryptographic assumptions. Our implementation demonstrates that RAG Sign adds minimal overhead, confirming its practicality for real-world deployment to improve the security of RAG-integrated LLM systems.

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Cryptographic Authentication for Private RAG-Enabled LLMs

  • Stephen. A. Holmes

摘要

We present RAG Sign, a cryptographic framework designed to establish immutable identities for RAG-enabled LLM signed outputs. This provides cryptographically authenticated, non-repudiable evidence that outputs originated with a specific RAG-enabled LLM bound to model instances via digital signatures. We perform a rigorous security analysis, demonstrating the unforgeability and non-repudiation properties of our scheme under standard cryptographic assumptions. Our implementation demonstrates that RAG Sign adds minimal overhead, confirming its practicality for real-world deployment to improve the security of RAG-integrated LLM systems.