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We consider a version of Gale and Shapley’s (College admissions and the stability of marriage 69:9–15) marriage market featuring a continuum of women and men based on Greinecker and Kah (Pairwise stable matching in large economies 89:2929–2974). We define a deferred acceptance algorithm for this setting and show that it terminates after a finite number of iterations to yield a side-optimal stable matching.

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A Deferred Acceptance Algorithm for Large Marriage Markets

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Guilherme Carmona,
  • Krittanai Laohakunakorn

摘要

We consider a version of Gale and Shapley’s (College admissions and the stability of marriage 69:9–15) marriage market featuring a continuum of women and men based on Greinecker and Kah (Pairwise stable matching in large economies 89:2929–2974). We define a deferred acceptance algorithm for this setting and show that it terminates after a finite number of iterations to yield a side-optimal stable matching.