Scholarlink

This chapter studies the effect of a liquidity event on holders of SAFEs. Pre-money SAFEs provide holders with a choice of action, which results in a situation where the value a SAFE holder receives can be dependent on the choices of other SAFE holders. This situation is analyzed as a game and it is shown that the game has an optimal pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This game is also used to analyze post-money SAFEs and it is shown that the formulation of payout as a maximum in these SAFEs is well-defined. However, when both pre-money and post-money SAFEs are present, the game may not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, the distribution of dividends for post-money SAFEs is assessed.

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Liquidity Events with Multiple SAFEs

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

查看全文
  • Ron van der Meyden,
  • Michael J. Maher

摘要

This chapter studies the effect of a liquidity event on holders of SAFEs. Pre-money SAFEs provide holders with a choice of action, which results in a situation where the value a SAFE holder receives can be dependent on the choices of other SAFE holders. This situation is analyzed as a game and it is shown that the game has an optimal pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This game is also used to analyze post-money SAFEs and it is shown that the formulation of payout as a maximum in these SAFEs is well-defined. However, when both pre-money and post-money SAFEs are present, the game may not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, the distribution of dividends for post-money SAFEs is assessed.