This paper examines the underlying political framework that constituted the fragile stability that led to the October 7 attack, focusing on the impasse of democracy for Palestinians. It attempts to identify the reasons and mechanisms why democracy has not been achieved in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, despite high expectations for it since the Oslo peace process. Hypotheses such as political culture, Islam, and factionalism are examined. It also discusses the political participation of Islamic parties, especially Hamas, as an alternative to democracy. By examining the dispute over its ascendancy in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, and by analyzing statements following the issuance of the Charter, this paper points to the pragmatic aspect of Hamas and its shift in political stance. Furthermore, an examination of subsequent developments suggests that the dual governments, which reflect the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, have acted as a central cause of the political stalemate. The influence of the international community on the dual governments is also discussed. This paper clarifies what went wrong after the Oslo Accords in terms of the development of Palestinian democracy and reveals the process of building stability that conceals fundamental issues.