The latest trend in auction design involves creating mechanisms that encourage buyers to bring new participants into the auction through their social networks [18]. This presents a unique challenge because buyers are in competition with each other, and effective incentives must be crafted to motivate them to invite peers. Various intriguing mechanisms have been developed for single-item sales, but they all depend on the trustworthiness of the seller or a third party to ensure proper implementation. Additionally, these mechanisms may compromise privacy by exposing the connections of participants. To address these issues, distributed mechanisms that protect privacy are more desirable in practice. In this paper, we introduce the first distributed auction mechanism in social networks that maintains the confidentiality of buyers’ connections and achieves full decentralization without relying on a trustworthy intermediary. Furthermore, our mechanism’s centralized reduction presents an interesting approach to calculating participants’ contributions, offering a distinct improvement over existing methods.

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A Summary of Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks

  • Haoxin Liu,
  • Yao Zhang

摘要

The latest trend in auction design involves creating mechanisms that encourage buyers to bring new participants into the auction through their social networks [18]. This presents a unique challenge because buyers are in competition with each other, and effective incentives must be crafted to motivate them to invite peers. Various intriguing mechanisms have been developed for single-item sales, but they all depend on the trustworthiness of the seller or a third party to ensure proper implementation. Additionally, these mechanisms may compromise privacy by exposing the connections of participants. To address these issues, distributed mechanisms that protect privacy are more desirable in practice. In this paper, we introduce the first distributed auction mechanism in social networks that maintains the confidentiality of buyers’ connections and achieves full decentralization without relying on a trustworthy intermediary. Furthermore, our mechanism’s centralized reduction presents an interesting approach to calculating participants’ contributions, offering a distinct improvement over existing methods.