In 2023, Uganda achieved a significant milestone with the commissioning of four 132/33 kV substations as part of the Grid Expansion and Renovation Project. One of the challenges during the energization of a 132 kV substation arose due to the presence of a double circuit line connecting two substations, Substation-A and Substation-B. Substation-C was situated between these two substations, and the existing line, referred to as line AB, needed to undergo a Loop In Loop Out (LILO) at Substation-C. The LILO operation would transform the existing line AB into two separate lines, AC and BC. The LILO operation at Substation-C was crucial for energizing this substation. However, complications emerged as the communication equipment at Substation-C was not ready, affecting the proper functioning of the line differential protection for lines AC and BC. Additionally, some SCADA-related work at Substation-C remained incomplete, leading to a lack of visibility from the national control center. To address this, a decision was made to connect line AB in such a way that the bus bar at Substation-C would become part of line AB. This solution ensured that there would be no change in the communication link, and the line could continue to be monitored from Substation-A and Substation-B. The double circuit line AB would pass through two different bus bars at Substation-C, with the bus coupler remaining open. Both ends of the existing line AB already had one distance and one-line differential protection. The line differential and distance protection for line AB remained unchanged. However, a new challenge arose when it was decided to commission the 40 MVA 132/33 kV transformer at Substation-C. The energization of the transformer acted like a tap load in line AB, creating a risk of the line tripping due to the operation of line differential protection. Considering the critical role of line AB in power evacuation and supplying major cities in Uganda, tripping during the transformer energization was not acceptable. To address this, a scheme was implemented at both Substation-A and Substation-C, where the line differential protection was interlocked with line distance protection. To enhance the scheme’s robustness, the inherent distance protection functions of both the line differential relay and the distance protection relay in the second relay were employed to formulate logic for interlocking line differential protection with line distance protection. All line distance and line differential protections were IEC 61,850 compatible, facilitating the creation of interlocked logic through GOOSE communication between the relays. This paper provides a detailed discussion of the implementation of this distance-interlocked line differential protection and the challenges faced during the logic implementation. We aim for this paper to serve as a reference guide for utility engineers seeking to apply similar logic at their substations.

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GOOSE-Driven Distance Interlocking: Implementation Strategies and Lessons Learned in Uganda

  • Pankaj Kumar Jha,
  • Ashwani Devgune,
  • M. S. Hada

摘要

In 2023, Uganda achieved a significant milestone with the commissioning of four 132/33 kV substations as part of the Grid Expansion and Renovation Project. One of the challenges during the energization of a 132 kV substation arose due to the presence of a double circuit line connecting two substations, Substation-A and Substation-B. Substation-C was situated between these two substations, and the existing line, referred to as line AB, needed to undergo a Loop In Loop Out (LILO) at Substation-C. The LILO operation would transform the existing line AB into two separate lines, AC and BC. The LILO operation at Substation-C was crucial for energizing this substation. However, complications emerged as the communication equipment at Substation-C was not ready, affecting the proper functioning of the line differential protection for lines AC and BC. Additionally, some SCADA-related work at Substation-C remained incomplete, leading to a lack of visibility from the national control center. To address this, a decision was made to connect line AB in such a way that the bus bar at Substation-C would become part of line AB. This solution ensured that there would be no change in the communication link, and the line could continue to be monitored from Substation-A and Substation-B. The double circuit line AB would pass through two different bus bars at Substation-C, with the bus coupler remaining open. Both ends of the existing line AB already had one distance and one-line differential protection. The line differential and distance protection for line AB remained unchanged. However, a new challenge arose when it was decided to commission the 40 MVA 132/33 kV transformer at Substation-C. The energization of the transformer acted like a tap load in line AB, creating a risk of the line tripping due to the operation of line differential protection. Considering the critical role of line AB in power evacuation and supplying major cities in Uganda, tripping during the transformer energization was not acceptable. To address this, a scheme was implemented at both Substation-A and Substation-C, where the line differential protection was interlocked with line distance protection. To enhance the scheme’s robustness, the inherent distance protection functions of both the line differential relay and the distance protection relay in the second relay were employed to formulate logic for interlocking line differential protection with line distance protection. All line distance and line differential protections were IEC 61,850 compatible, facilitating the creation of interlocked logic through GOOSE communication between the relays. This paper provides a detailed discussion of the implementation of this distance-interlocked line differential protection and the challenges faced during the logic implementation. We aim for this paper to serve as a reference guide for utility engineers seeking to apply similar logic at their substations.