The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne remains one of the most consequential diplomatic settlements in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean. It formalised the borders of the newly established Turkish Republic and redefined its relationship with Greece, shaping the regional order for the century that followed. Although extensive scholarship has examined questions such as minority protections, the Kurdish and Armenian settlements, and Greek–Turkish relations, less sustained attention has been devoted to the diplomatic practices and strategic calculations of the participating powers. In particular, while mid-twentieth-century historiography mapped British objectives in broad terms, the role of Lord Curzon as the principal architect and manager of the Conference warrants closer scrutiny. Contemporary perceptions of Curzon were not uniformly favourable. Winston Churchill famously remarked that he “thought too much about stating his case, and too little about getting things done”. Yet such judgements invite re-examination in light of Lausanne’s outcome. This chapter reassesses British strategy at Lausanne through a focused analysis of Curzon’s conduct as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It traces the evolution of his negotiating tactics, highlighting the extent to which they were grounded in long-standing familiarity with the region and informed by the strategic lessons of the Eastern Mediterranean conflicts of 1912–1922. Particular attention is given to Curzon’s navigation of interdepartmental tensions—with the Admiralty, the War Office, and at times even the Cabinet and the Prime Minister—as well as his efforts to maintain Allied cohesion while safeguarding core imperial interests. By situating his diplomacy within the broader post-war recalibration of British policy, the chapter argues that British conduct at Lausanne was neither improvised nor purely reactive. Rather, it reflected a deliberate attempt to consolidate gains secured during and after the Great War while adapting to the altered balance of power produced by Turkish military success. Through this lens, Lausanne emerges not simply as a treaty settlement, but as a revealing case study in late imperial statecraft and strategic adjustment.