Research on the Price Ceiling Strategy for EMU Trains Based on a Bilateral Monopoly Model

Rational determination of the price ceilings for Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) trains and their advanced maintenance services is a crucial method for railway enterprises to reduce procurement costs and improve efficiency. It also serves as a significant measure to promote deeper collaboration between EMU suppliers and buyers in areas such as train development and maintenance. Based on the technical and economic attributes of EMU procurement—characterized by large-scale and stable demand, difficulties in manufacturing cost calculation, high lifecycle maintenance expenses, and a limited number of suppliers—this paper constructs a procurement pricing model for EMU trains within a bilateral monopoly market structure. The model analyzes the price determination mechanisms for both complete EMU trains and advanced maintenance services. The research results indicate that there is no Nash equilibrium for the procurement prices of complete EMU trains and advanced maintenance services. Strategic cooperation between China State Railway Group and CRRC Corporation across multiple domains, including EMU development and maintenance, aligns with the long-term interests of both parties.