Executive Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Implications for Sustainable Economic Governance in Vietnam

This study explores the influence of executive ownership and firm performance on corporate tax avoidance in Vietnam, an emerging market with concentrated ownership and a collectivist corporate culture. Using panel data from 2,056 observations across 257 listed firms on HOSE and HNX from 2016 to 2023, the study applies feasible generalized least squares estimation to address heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Results indicate that CEO ownership has a significant positive effect on TA_Index (an inverted measure of Cash ETR), implying that greater executive control is associated with more aggressive tax avoidance. ROA also shows a positive relationship with TA_Index, suggesting that more profitable firms tend to optimize taxes more actively. Conversely, Chairman ownership has no significant effect. These findings support agency theory and political cost theory, while also emphasizing the unique role of managerial authority in influencing tax practices in Vietnam. Unlike prior studies that emphasize both executive and board ownership, this study shows that in emerging markets like Vietnam, tax decisions are primarily driven by CEO incentives rather than board oversight.