As a promising solution to the blockchain scalability problem, the payment channel network (PCN) not only improves the transaction throughput in the public chain, but also has suitable application scenarios in the permissioned blockchain, such as Electronic Toll Collection (ETC). However, PCN introduces new privacy challenges such as balance confidentiality, relationship anonymity, and payment privacy. In this work, to address the issue of user privacy leakage in PCN, we propose a practical privacy-preserving payment channel model, PPCPP. In the transaction phase, our scheme adopts homomorphic encryption and secure two-party computation to provide users with reliable privacy protection without Certificate Authority (CA) decryption verification. In the withdrawal phase, the channel balance is compared with the withdrawal amount without leaking any balance information. In addition, our scheme can jointly process multiple channel withdrawals of the same user, reducing the number of on-chain and off-chain interactions to 1, thereby alleviating on-chain pressure. Our performance evaluation of PPCPP shows that it takes only 30 ms to encrypt a transaction, accounting for only 0.2% of the overhead in real network environments, thus demonstrating their feasibility for deployment in practice. In terms of routing success rate, compared with zk-PCN and LN, PPCPP has improvements under most conditions.

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PPCPP: A Practical Payment Channel Model with Privacy Protection

  • Haonan Huo,
  • Di Liu,
  • Jiarui Li,
  • Guoyan Zhang

摘要

As a promising solution to the blockchain scalability problem, the payment channel network (PCN) not only improves the transaction throughput in the public chain, but also has suitable application scenarios in the permissioned blockchain, such as Electronic Toll Collection (ETC). However, PCN introduces new privacy challenges such as balance confidentiality, relationship anonymity, and payment privacy. In this work, to address the issue of user privacy leakage in PCN, we propose a practical privacy-preserving payment channel model, PPCPP. In the transaction phase, our scheme adopts homomorphic encryption and secure two-party computation to provide users with reliable privacy protection without Certificate Authority (CA) decryption verification. In the withdrawal phase, the channel balance is compared with the withdrawal amount without leaking any balance information. In addition, our scheme can jointly process multiple channel withdrawals of the same user, reducing the number of on-chain and off-chain interactions to 1, thereby alleviating on-chain pressure. Our performance evaluation of PPCPP shows that it takes only 30 ms to encrypt a transaction, accounting for only 0.2% of the overhead in real network environments, thus demonstrating their feasibility for deployment in practice. In terms of routing success rate, compared with zk-PCN and LN, PPCPP has improvements under most conditions.