Scholarlink

The quantum resistance of lattice-based cryptography becomes moot if its deployment introduces exploitable side-channels. We present the first comprehensive vulnerability assessment of NIST standardized post-quantum algorithms within ARM TrustZone. Through systematic evaluation on NXP i.MX93 hardware running OP-TEE 4.4, we demonstrate that integrating Dilithium-3 and Kyber-768 into existing TEE architectures creates critical vulnerabilities: (i) near-deterministic operation classification (98.9% accuracy) through timing side-channels from unprivileged processes, exploiting 49.6% overhead and 13 \(\times \) world-switch frequency versus classical algorithms; (ii) rejection sampling leaking 0.192 bits per signing operation, enabling key recovery within  50,000 observations; (iii) complete denial-of-service where Dilithium’s 73KB footprint exceeds the 32KB TA heap; and (iv) 40 \(\times \) latency increase under concurrent workloads. Our analysis traces these vulnerabilities to fundamental TEE design decisions—synchronous invocation, shared caches, static memory pools—incompatible with PQC computational patterns. We quantify mitigation efficacy and release our measurement framework for reproducible assessment.

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

On the Feasibility of Deploying Lattice-Based PQC in ARM TrustZone TEEs: A Systematic Vulnerability Assessment

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

查看全文
  • Hyunmin Kim

摘要

The quantum resistance of lattice-based cryptography becomes moot if its deployment introduces exploitable side-channels. We present the first comprehensive vulnerability assessment of NIST standardized post-quantum algorithms within ARM TrustZone. Through systematic evaluation on NXP i.MX93 hardware running OP-TEE 4.4, we demonstrate that integrating Dilithium-3 and Kyber-768 into existing TEE architectures creates critical vulnerabilities: (i) near-deterministic operation classification (98.9% accuracy) through timing side-channels from unprivileged processes, exploiting 49.6% overhead and 13 \(\times \) world-switch frequency versus classical algorithms; (ii) rejection sampling leaking 0.192 bits per signing operation, enabling key recovery within  50,000 observations; (iii) complete denial-of-service where Dilithium’s 73KB footprint exceeds the 32KB TA heap; and (iv) 40 \(\times \) latency increase under concurrent workloads. Our analysis traces these vulnerabilities to fundamental TEE design decisions—synchronous invocation, shared caches, static memory pools—incompatible with PQC computational patterns. We quantify mitigation efficacy and release our measurement framework for reproducible assessment.