Middle Powers’ Effort in Maintaining a Technical Edge amid the Politics of Semiconductors

The Sino-US tech competition, initiated in 2018 by the first Trump administration (2017–2020), evolved into the area of the semiconductor industry in Joe Biden’s administration (2021–2024). At the focal point of this competition are the building blocks of modern society, namely Computer Chips, whose production is highly concentrated in East Asia. The development of computation-power hungry technologies, such as supercomputers, artificial intelligence (AI) and high-end telecommunication devices, relies on access to cutting-edge Integrated Circuits. Not only did China vow to “have technology self-reliance (自立, Zili) and self-improvement (自強, Ziqiang)” in its 14th Five-Year Plan in early 2021, but also Joe Biden’s 2021 Supply Chain Review Report and the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 signified an increasing promotion of the “Buy American” idea. While the above developments have direct implications for the supply and demand of computer chips, this chapter investigates by January 2025 how Taiwan, Korea and Japan, as important actors in the global semiconductor supply chain, are responding to the structural pressure and realigning their production bases amid this great powers’ rivalry and understanding its implications for these middle powers and the world.