The Strategic Effectiveness of Workarounding for Tech Middle Powers

This chapter evaluates the theoretical and empirical usefulness of workarounding as a cooperation strategy for tech middle powers. Workarounding is characterized by pragmatic, small group cooperation that excludes participation by tech great powers like the US and China. After making a case for distinguishing between middle power preferences and strategies to systematize middle power analysis, I evaluate workarounding in reference to three middle power preferences: a systemic preference for global order, a functional preference to ensure middle power influence and a reputational preference to be seen as trusted, effective, and independent political actors. I subsequently examine how characteristics of the global tech context may alter workarounding’s perceived usefulness. These expectations are tested in a case study of one example of digital workarounding: the Digital Nations group on digital governance. The findings indicate workarounding is even more useful in tech than middle power theory would suggest, ensuring its central place in tech middle powers’ strategic portfolio for years to come.