This chapter explains how cooperatives differ from investor-owned firms and what this means for management and sustainability. Drawing on organizational economics, it argues that firms exist to overcome market failures such as transaction costs, incomplete contracts, and information asymmetry. Different ownership forms—investor-owned, cooperative, and nonprofit—emerge depending on which stakeholder faces the highest contracting costs and which ownership structure minimizes collective decision-making, agency, and opportunism costs. Cooperatives are distinctive because users or workers are also the owners. This “mutuality” aligns enterprise activities with members’ needs rather than investor returns. Cooperatives are also hybrid organizations, combining an economic enterprise with a social association, and they emphasize solidarity both among members and across the cooperative sector. These features shape their strategies, governance, and relationships with stakeholders. The chapter identifies three main sources of value creation in cooperatives: (1) the ownership effect, which improves incentives and trust when users or workers control the firm; (2) cooperation and solidarity among members, which foster peer learning, capability building, and collective problem-solving; and (3) cooperation among cooperatives, which enables synergies, shared resources, and stronger sectoral support. However, cooperatives also face structural weaknesses: free-rider problems, rising collective decision-making costs as membership grows more diverse, and limits on capital financing due to non-transferable and volatile equity. Effective cooperative management must therefore strengthen cooperative advantages while designing governance, incentives, and financial mechanisms to mitigate these weaknesses.