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This chapter analyses how geopolitics is shifting international economic relations from binding multilateral treaties towards flexible frameworks. Two case studies—the EU-India Trade and Technology Council and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (US-Vietnam focus)—show how both form (soft, minilateral, flexible) and content (digital sovereignty, economic security, supply chains) are driven by security considerations. For the EU-India TTC, the logic is hedging against China and reducing India’s dependence on Russia, constrained by divisions within the EU regarding India’s structural ties to Russia. For IPEF, variable geometry facilitates US-Vietnam cooperation, but US domestic politics, President Trump’s tariffs, and Vietnam’s hedging limit deeper rule-making. The chapter concludes that these frameworks institutionalise flexibility—helping states react to geopolitical shocks but weakening multilateralism, non-discrimination, and predictable enforcement. The emerging order is a geoeconomic middle ground where informal, plurilateral arrangements substitute for WTO-style rules.

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How Geopolitics Shape New Forms of International Economic Ordering

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Alexandros Bakos

摘要

This chapter analyses how geopolitics is shifting international economic relations from binding multilateral treaties towards flexible frameworks. Two case studies—the EU-India Trade and Technology Council and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (US-Vietnam focus)—show how both form (soft, minilateral, flexible) and content (digital sovereignty, economic security, supply chains) are driven by security considerations. For the EU-India TTC, the logic is hedging against China and reducing India’s dependence on Russia, constrained by divisions within the EU regarding India’s structural ties to Russia. For IPEF, variable geometry facilitates US-Vietnam cooperation, but US domestic politics, President Trump’s tariffs, and Vietnam’s hedging limit deeper rule-making. The chapter concludes that these frameworks institutionalise flexibility—helping states react to geopolitical shocks but weakening multilateralism, non-discrimination, and predictable enforcement. The emerging order is a geoeconomic middle ground where informal, plurilateral arrangements substitute for WTO-style rules.