The US containment policy toward China emerged in the context of the military conflict between the two countries in Korea, but did not end with the ceasefire in the Korean War. In the second half of 1953, the National Security Council frequently discussed US China policy and produced several policy documents, forming a systematic containment policy of China. For example, NSC 151/1 and 152/2 of July 1953 established US economic policy toward China. NSC 146/1 of October 28 and NSC 146/2 of November 7 of the same year introduced US Taiwan policy. They argued that Taiwan was an indispensable political instrument for the United States to pursue a long-term containment policy toward China and its relatively advanced state of material development, industrialization, and literacy, its high agricultural productivity, its knowledge and application of modern methods could make it, with proper guidance, assistance, encouragement and opportunity for trade, a splendid “show window” of the free world in Asia. Taiwan had significant strategic value, and it would “considerably improve the Chinese communist strategic position” if it were in their hands. In the same way, it would substantially strengthen the strategic position of the United States if it were in “friendly hands.” Therefore, “it would be in the U.S. interest to incorporate Formosa and the Pescadores within U.S. Far East defense positions by taking all necessary measures to prevent hostile forces from gaining control thereof, even at grave risk of general war.” NSC 166 and NSC166/1 released on October 19 and November 6 in the same year, respectively, elaborated on the US policy toward China.

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American Containment of China (II)

  • Wenzhao Tao

摘要

The US containment policy toward China emerged in the context of the military conflict between the two countries in Korea, but did not end with the ceasefire in the Korean War. In the second half of 1953, the National Security Council frequently discussed US China policy and produced several policy documents, forming a systematic containment policy of China. For example, NSC 151/1 and 152/2 of July 1953 established US economic policy toward China. NSC 146/1 of October 28 and NSC 146/2 of November 7 of the same year introduced US Taiwan policy. They argued that Taiwan was an indispensable political instrument for the United States to pursue a long-term containment policy toward China and its relatively advanced state of material development, industrialization, and literacy, its high agricultural productivity, its knowledge and application of modern methods could make it, with proper guidance, assistance, encouragement and opportunity for trade, a splendid “show window” of the free world in Asia. Taiwan had significant strategic value, and it would “considerably improve the Chinese communist strategic position” if it were in their hands. In the same way, it would substantially strengthen the strategic position of the United States if it were in “friendly hands.” Therefore, “it would be in the U.S. interest to incorporate Formosa and the Pescadores within U.S. Far East defense positions by taking all necessary measures to prevent hostile forces from gaining control thereof, even at grave risk of general war.” NSC 166 and NSC166/1 released on October 19 and November 6 in the same year, respectively, elaborated on the US policy toward China.