SPEEDY is a family of ultra-low-latency block ciphers designed by Leander et al. in 2021. In 2023, Boura et al. proposed a differential attack on the full 7-round variant, SPEEDY-7-192. However, shortly thereafter, Beyne and Neyt demonstrated that this attack was invalid, as the dominant differential characteristic it relied upon had probability zero. A similar issue affects another differential attack proposed the same year by Wang et al., which also targets SPEEDY-7-192 and suffers from the same flaw. As a result, the question of finding a valid attack on this cipher remained an open problem. In this work, we resolve this problem by presenting the first valid differential attack on SPEEDY-7-192. We verify the validity of our distinguisher using the quasidifferential framework. Moreover, our search for the differential distinguisher is significantly more rigorous than in previous works: starting from a pool of one-round trails, our method explores a larger portion of the search space. We also fully exploit probabilistic extensions of the distinguisher to identify optimal parameters for the key recovery step. Our best attack on SPEEDY-7-192 is a chosen-ciphertext attack with data and time complexity of \(2^{174.53}\) . In addition, we present differential attacks on 4-round SPEEDY-5-192 and 5-round SPEEDY-6-192, which currently represent the best known attacks against these smaller variants.