This chapter aims to analyze the intellective faculty and wisdom (al-ḥikmah), the virtue associated with this faculty, in the ethical treatise of the Muslim theologian and ethicist ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī. It focuses in particular on three selected commentaries, those of Shams Al-Dīn Al-Kirmānī, ʿAlā’ Al-Dīn Al-Kāzarūnī, and Tashkoprizadeh Ahmet Efendi, by comparing and contrasting their contributions with al-Ījī’s original text. It first seeks to briefly show the roots of the three faculties of the human soul in Plato’s thought, and their respective virtues in Aristotelian philosophy. Plato’s ethical structure was based on distinct faculties as described in The Republic. Aristotle, by contrast, relied on the integration of certain functions of the soul. Then, the intellective faculty and wisdom (al-ḥikmah) as its virtue will be analyzed in detail in Al-Kirmānī, Al-Kāzarūnī, and Tashkoprizadeh’s commentaries (shurūḥ), thereby attempting to demonstrate how Al-Ījī’s concepts of the intellective faculty and wisdom are received and further developed by the commentators. The chapter underlines that Al-Ījī’s treatise provided the essence of practical philosophy until his time through its brevity and condensed form in the Arabic language. The first commentator Al-Kirmānī’s approach to wisdom is in line with his teacher Al-Ījī along with additional elaboration. Despite Al-Kirmānī being a muḥaddith and jurist, his focus on wisdom is more philosophical. The second commentator Al-Kāzarūnī elaborates more on Al-Ījī’s text, focusing on key concepts. Al-Kāzarūnī’s approach shows a sophisticated intellectual synthesis that bridges Islamic concepts with philosophical ethics by connecting the Qur’anic concept of khilāfah (divine vicegerency) with philosophical notions of wisdom. Moreover, Al-Kāzarūnī analyzes the faculties of the human soul (nafs): their virtues, excess, and deficiency, which are briefly indicated in Al-Ījī’s text. Furthermore, Al-Kāzarūnī attempts to integrate theological, philosophical, and ethical thinking. The third commentator Tashkoprizadeh uses a dialectical approach by presenting wisdom through complementary perspectives—as both action and essence, and the textual argumentation relies heavily on intertextual authority. Tashkoprizadeh’s structural progression moves from definition to scriptural validation to practical application, revealing a methodical scholarly approach. Also, Tashkoprizadeh interestingly discusses degrees for the completion (kamāl) of the rational soul with wisdom in three levels. These degrees are certain knowledge (‘ilm al-yaqin), the essence of certainty (‘ayn al-yaqin), and the truth of certainty (haqq al-yaqin). In this way, he incorporates his knowledge of Sufi literature into the concept of philosophical wisdom. In addition, the chapter demonstrates that the purpose of commentaries (shurūḥ) in classical Islamic scholarship, as evidenced by these three ethical commentaries, seems to extend beyond merely resolving textual difficulties. Rather, commentaries serve to comprehend contemporary demands and offer fresh interpretations informed by each commentator’s distinctive knowledge and intellectual background. Finally, this chapter shows the expansion of the discourse of the intellective faculty and its associated virtue, wisdom. This happens through an initial discourse that is mostly philosophical in nature and then broadens to encompass religious, theological, and Sufi views.