The question of intersubjectivity concerns the possibility of accessing the self-consciousness of others. Husserl traced the emergence of self-consciousness itself and showed that the basis of intersubjectivity is constituted by “pairing”—the primal association in passive synthesis. Passive synthesis of instinct intentionality creates an original flow of time between mother and child. From this original flow of time, which arises before the distinction between subject and object, the subject becomes aware of itself as a subject during each individual’s childhood. This forms the basis for the emergence of self-consciousness. This account of the origin of intersubjectivity provides a phenomenological epistemological basis for M. Buber’s I-Thou relationship in childhood, which emphasizes the encounter with the other (the I-Thou relationship). Furthermore, it shows that Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is teleologically oriented toward the realization of an encounter with the Thou, namely through its epistemological critique of E. Levinas’ argument, which completely denies the possibility of an encounter.

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To Feel Another Person’s Pain As If It Were Your Own

  • Ichiro Yamaguchi

摘要

The question of intersubjectivity concerns the possibility of accessing the self-consciousness of others. Husserl traced the emergence of self-consciousness itself and showed that the basis of intersubjectivity is constituted by “pairing”—the primal association in passive synthesis. Passive synthesis of instinct intentionality creates an original flow of time between mother and child. From this original flow of time, which arises before the distinction between subject and object, the subject becomes aware of itself as a subject during each individual’s childhood. This forms the basis for the emergence of self-consciousness. This account of the origin of intersubjectivity provides a phenomenological epistemological basis for M. Buber’s I-Thou relationship in childhood, which emphasizes the encounter with the other (the I-Thou relationship). Furthermore, it shows that Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is teleologically oriented toward the realization of an encounter with the Thou, namely through its epistemological critique of E. Levinas’ argument, which completely denies the possibility of an encounter.