The modern international economic legal order survives the changes and upheavals caused by the transition from one model of the international order to another political and economic structure of the international community of states. A liberal, cosmopolitan order with multilateral decision-making mechanisms does not allow reaching an interstate consent. A reflection of the crisis in multilateral economic decision-making is the political and jurisdictional paralysis of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO rules and principles themselves have not lost their relevance but have actually lost the mechanisms for their implementation at the universal level. The response to the political crisis of multilateral economic associations was the regionalization of trade, investment, and financial cooperation. A paradoxical situation has emerged when the universal international legal values—equality and nondiscrimination—have found the potential for implementation at the mega-regional, regional, subregional, and bilateral levels. At the same time, regional cooperation makes it possible to form new international legal approaches that would reveal the needs of states with different socioeconomic levels of development. It is difficult to agree with ideas that criticize international law for inefficiency, since the problem is not in international law as a means of legally formalizing relations but in seeking the consent of states divided by questions about the goals and ways of further development of the international legal order. We are witnessing the collapse of the monopoly of Western states on international legal models of economic relations. For example, the idea of integration along the lines of the European Union does not stand up to criticism as a form of differentiation of powers between supranational bodies and member states of the association. The central point of division between developed and developing countries is on the issue of state support for economic development (market capitalist and state economic systems). And in this regard, we can say that the state is becoming a source of economic development (East), and the idea of market self-regulation (West) is being transformed and recedes into the past. Will this pattern find its place and formalization in the principles of international economic law? Maybe, yes. This, in particular, is evidenced by the experience of the USSR, which at the beginning of its historical path in bilateral trade agreements with European states consolidated the principle of the state monopoly of foreign trade. Another interesting trend is the politicization of international economic cooperation, which is reflected in the declining role of legal procedures in making economic decisions at the international level (e.g., G20). One of the consequences of such politicization is the growing role of the national legislation of states, which is clearly seen in the example of the regulation of investment legal relations. Thus, the modern transformation of international economic law is not just quantitative changes but precisely a qualitative transition to another international and national legal realities through acute interstate contradictions between developed and developing states.