Comparative Study of Land Systems: An Institutional Economics Analysis of Hong Kong’s Pre-application System for Land Auctions—Theoretical Misrepresentations and Political Demands in Hong Kong’s Land Conveyance Revenue System
摘要
The critique against so-called super rent (aka. “超级地租”) is fundamentally flawed due to its reliance on misrepresented factual premises regarding Hong Kong’s land administration system. Central to this criticism is the distorted portrayal of the Land Auction Pre-Application System (commonly mislabeled as “勾地制” or “collusive land allocation”), which is in reality a mechanism designed to regulate developer profits and ensure public value capture from land appreciation. Certain commentators, however, have mischaracterized this system as a collusive arrangement between the government and monopolistic real estate developers. This narrative not only misrepresents the system’s operational integrity but also aligns with broader political agendas seeking to undermine central government authority over Hong Kong’s land policy under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework.