Despite over a century of nation-building efforts, Lebanon remains deeply divided along sectarian lines, illustrating nation-building without effective peace-building. Lebanese electoral politics combine proportional representation and majoritarian systems, systematically favouring the established political elite. The relationship between the Lebanese ruling elite (zuama) and their constituencies is deeply clientelistic, characterized by nepotism, favouritism, sectarianism, confessionalism, and entrenched crony capitalism. Drawing upon Dahl’s concept of polyarchy and Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy, this chapter critically examines Lebanon’s institutional arrangements, emphasizing how consociational power-sharing principles operate within Lebanon’s unique political environment. While Arend Lijphart outlines four essential consociational principles—elite cooperation, mutual veto, proportional representation, and segmental autonomy—Lebanon’s persistent failure to achieve genuine national cohesion since its founding in 1920 has consistently undermined these ideals. The chapter addresses ongoing debates regarding Lebanon’s preferred democratic model: majoritarian democracy supported historically by Western- and Arab Gulf-backed coalitions versus consensual proportional representation advocated by the Syrian- and Iranian-backed “Axis of Resistance.” Given Lebanon’s demographic reality, with Muslims representing approximately 75 per cent of voters and Christians fewer than 25 per cent, this debate directly impacts demographic majority rule. The analysis covers historical developments, the Taif Agreement’s 50:50 Christian-Muslim power-sharing, and recent electoral reforms since 2018, emphasizing how entrenched political elites manipulate electoral systems to sustain their dominance. Finally, the chapter proposes practical constitutional amendments aimed at addressing systemic paralysis, suggesting a path forward for Lebanon’s troubled consociational experiment.