Post-quantum aggregation of signatures refers to combining multiple digital signatures into a single, compact representation while maintaining the same level of security and authenticity. This process reduces communication and storage overhead, making it especially useful for applications like blockchain, IoT, and distributed systems. Post-quantum aggregation uses cryptographic schemes resistant to quantum computer attacks, such as those based on lattices, codes, or hash functions. The framework security relies on hard lattice problems like Learning with Errors (LWE) or Short Integer Solution (SIS). We demonstrate the security of our construction in the programmable random oracle model. For N participants, the scheme tolerates up to \( N - 1 \) Byzantine failures under the assumption of a correct aggregator, and up to \( \left\lfloor \frac{N + 1}{3} \right\rfloor \) failures in the general case. Our final construction is more efficient than existing one, the state-of-the-art non-interactive scheme, which, unlike ours, is only a few-time signature scheme. Asymptotically, the signature sizes in our construction are polylogarithmic in the total number of participants.

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A Post-quantum Secure Lattice-Based Single-Shot BFT Based Aggregation of Signatures for Blockchain Technology

  • Rahul Singh,
  • Edubelli Sarath Chandra,
  • Kotamsetti Shanmukha Sai,
  • Laxminarayan Das,
  • Saurabh Rana,
  • Dharminder Chaudhary

摘要

Post-quantum aggregation of signatures refers to combining multiple digital signatures into a single, compact representation while maintaining the same level of security and authenticity. This process reduces communication and storage overhead, making it especially useful for applications like blockchain, IoT, and distributed systems. Post-quantum aggregation uses cryptographic schemes resistant to quantum computer attacks, such as those based on lattices, codes, or hash functions. The framework security relies on hard lattice problems like Learning with Errors (LWE) or Short Integer Solution (SIS). We demonstrate the security of our construction in the programmable random oracle model. For N participants, the scheme tolerates up to \( N - 1 \) Byzantine failures under the assumption of a correct aggregator, and up to \( \left\lfloor \frac{N + 1}{3} \right\rfloor \) failures in the general case. Our final construction is more efficient than existing one, the state-of-the-art non-interactive scheme, which, unlike ours, is only a few-time signature scheme. Asymptotically, the signature sizes in our construction are polylogarithmic in the total number of participants.