Mobile crowdsourcing refers to the use of mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, to gather information or perform tasks by leveraging the collective efforts of a large group of people. The paper considers one of the scenarios (setups) of the mobile crowdsourcing scenarios in a strategic setting. The setup consists of multiple task requesters and multiple task executors (or IoT devices). Each task requester is endowed with a single task. Each task requester reveals a preference list over the subset of IoT devices, and also each of the IoT devices gives a preference over the subset of task requesters. The preference lists of both parties (i.e., task requesters and IoT devices) are private in nature. Given such a scenario, we aim to allocate the best possible IoT device to each task requester from his/her revealed preference list. For this purpose, a truthful mechanism is proposed, and it is proved that it is computationally efficient. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the benchmark mechanism.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

An Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Two-Sided Matching Market in Mobile Crowdsourcing with Zero Budget

  • Chattu Bhargavi,
  • Vikash Kumar Singh

摘要

Mobile crowdsourcing refers to the use of mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, to gather information or perform tasks by leveraging the collective efforts of a large group of people. The paper considers one of the scenarios (setups) of the mobile crowdsourcing scenarios in a strategic setting. The setup consists of multiple task requesters and multiple task executors (or IoT devices). Each task requester is endowed with a single task. Each task requester reveals a preference list over the subset of IoT devices, and also each of the IoT devices gives a preference over the subset of task requesters. The preference lists of both parties (i.e., task requesters and IoT devices) are private in nature. Given such a scenario, we aim to allocate the best possible IoT device to each task requester from his/her revealed preference list. For this purpose, a truthful mechanism is proposed, and it is proved that it is computationally efficient. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the benchmark mechanism.