This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of news media bargaining codes, a legislative tool that can compel transnational platform operators to negotiate payment with news producers for content that appears on their services. Bargaining codes are seen as a means with which governments can indirectly intervene in the news media economy, thereby sidestepping issues of political influence and press freedom. After Australia led the way with the introduction of their News Media Bargaining Code in 2021, Canada introduced their Online News Act, and several other jurisdictions are contemplating comparable legislation. Three years on from the introduction of the Australian code, questions are arising over the effectiveness of bargaining codes, and whether other jurisdictions’ appetite for introducing similar legislation has diminished in the wake of Meta’s subsequent rejection of both the Australian and Canadian codes. The chapter provides a critique of bargaining codes as a regulatory instrument in various global markets.

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Compelling Negotiations? News Media Bargaining Codes as Regulatory Instruments

  • James Meese,
  • Diana Bossio,
  • Andrea Carson

摘要

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of news media bargaining codes, a legislative tool that can compel transnational platform operators to negotiate payment with news producers for content that appears on their services. Bargaining codes are seen as a means with which governments can indirectly intervene in the news media economy, thereby sidestepping issues of political influence and press freedom. After Australia led the way with the introduction of their News Media Bargaining Code in 2021, Canada introduced their Online News Act, and several other jurisdictions are contemplating comparable legislation. Three years on from the introduction of the Australian code, questions are arising over the effectiveness of bargaining codes, and whether other jurisdictions’ appetite for introducing similar legislation has diminished in the wake of Meta’s subsequent rejection of both the Australian and Canadian codes. The chapter provides a critique of bargaining codes as a regulatory instrument in various global markets.