Using transaction cost economics (TCE) and Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis, this chapter evaluates how the newly emerged governance structures (government-dominated, market-invested, and self-organized) mitigate project risks—including administrative uncertainty, market volatility, financing constraints, information asymmetry, and opportunistic behavior—and then minimizing transaction costs. The analysis reveals that government-dominated models remain predominant (71.43% of cases), particularly in large-scale, high-uncertainty projects, due to their superior administrative control and financing capacity. Market-invested models (21.43%) excel in contexts requiring flexible pricing and incentive alignment, while self-organized models (7.14%) prove effective in localized, socially cohesive settings but struggle with cross-village coordination. These findings challenge the assumption that market mechanisms universally optimize rural land development. Instead, they highlight the context-dependent efficiency of each governance structure, emphasizing the indispensable role of government regulation in high-risk TDR system. The study concludes with policy recommendations for tailored governance alignments, advocating for hybrid approaches that leverage the strengths of each model based on project-specific attributes.