This study provides a comprehensive institutional analysis of China’s “Linkage” Policy, examining its impact on land governance, rural development, and cultivated land preservation. Specifically, this book addresses three key questions: (1) how the policy reshapes China’s land institutions, (2) how diversified local governance structures reduce transaction costs, and (3) whether the policy achieves its intended goals. Through empirical analysis of Chengdu Municipality, this book reveals that the “Linkage” Policy introduces a market-based transferable development rights TDR system, decoupling development rights from land ownership to facilitate rural–urban quota trading. While the policy enhances rural development financing and land preservation, its effectiveness varies across governance models—government-dominated, market-invested, and self-organized—each presenting distinct advantages and constraints. The findings highlight persistent challenges, including institutional ambiguities, market distortions, and stakeholder coordination issues. The study contributes to broader debates on institutional change, property rights evolution, and multi-level governance in transitional economies, offering policy insights for balancing central directives with local adaptation, coordinating government-market-community in land governance, as well as promoting balanced urban–rural developments.