In the previous chapter we gave an axiomatic foundation of having subjective belief in the form of a probability measure. It is worth questioning if the decision maker’s subjective belief can be described by a single probability measure, an additive set-function. In other words, it is worth questioning the axiom which characterizes a probabilistic belief, that is the eventwise separability axiom or the independence axiom.

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Ambiguity of Belief

  • Takashi Hayashi

摘要

In the previous chapter we gave an axiomatic foundation of having subjective belief in the form of a probability measure. It is worth questioning if the decision maker’s subjective belief can be described by a single probability measure, an additive set-function. In other words, it is worth questioning the axiom which characterizes a probabilistic belief, that is the eventwise separability axiom or the independence axiom.